Not Getting Over The Hill... A Criticism Of The Yorkshire Ripper Tort Case

Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1988] 1 AC 53 was a landmark case in establishing limits on third party liability for tortious negligence. The estate of Hill, the final victim of Peter Sutcliffe (better known as the Yorkshire Ripper), sued the Chief Constable of West Yorkshire police, claiming that their failure to apprehend the killer sooner negligently caused her death.

Anyone with some knowledge of the Yorkshire Ripper case is aware of the disastrous investigation led by the police, which failed time-and-time-again to catch Sutcliffe, who they had interviewed nine times in connection with the murders. The 1982 Byford report heavily criticised the police for what was, at the time, the largest manhunt in British history – they had focussed too heavily on hoax confessional tapes and letters (against the advice of experts and victims alike) and their poor filing system meant that officers were left underprepared and key connections were not made linking evidence to Sutcliffe. Nevertheless, the Lords dismissed Hill’s claim and held that the police were not liable for negligently causing her death.

How was this the case, when the police were so roundly criticised by everyone from the Prime Minister to feminist groups, and openly acknowledged their own failures? Simply put, the police did not owe a duty of care to Hill, and therefore there was no breach. For the purposes of this case, you must remember that Sutcliffe murdered Hill, not the police!

There is a presumption against a duty of care being owed by third parties to victims of tortious negligence. Lord Toulson in the case of Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police held that “English law does not as a general rule impose liability on a defendant for injury or damage to the person or property of a claimant caused by the conduct of a third party.” But, as with everything in the law, there are exceptions, as set out in Caparo. For there to be a duty of care in negligence, three criteria must be satisfied:

• Harm must be reasonably foreseeable as a result of the defendant's conduct, 
• The parties must be in a relationship of proximity
• It must be fair, just, and reasonable to impose liability

Of course, it is reasonably foreseeable that should the police not apprehend one of England's most notorious serial killers that he would continue his crime spree. This is not contended by anyone in this case - and the appellant relies heavily on this assumption. Furthermore, the courts have already held it fair, just, and reasonable to place a duty of care on the public bodies to those under their control, such as in Dorset Yacht. 

It is on the relationship of proximity - the so-called 'special relationship' test - that Hill's claim fails. Lord Keith of Kinkel notes explicitly that the police made numerous mistakes which evidenced their lack of reasonable care and skill in handling the case, but while the police have a duty of care to the general public to enforce the criminal law, they have no such duty of care to individuals - in this case, Hill. Despite the attempts of the appellants to narrow the class of general public to a smaller group to whom the police would have owed a duty - young brunettes in the West Yorkshire area - the Lords still rejected this argument, as the class was still too broad. 

Not only this, but the police didn't have any kind of control over Sutcliffe, according to Keith's speech in the Lords. They didn't know who he was, where he was, when he would strike next, or who his next victim would be. Unlike in the classroom case of Carmarthenshire v Lewis, the police could not be said to have any level of control over Sutcliffe. 

I do not find this convincing for three reasons. Firstly, I do not see how the class was 'too broad' when narrowed to young brunettes in the West Yorkshire area, particularly when such a clear pattern had emerged of the class of victims Sutcliffe attacked. Secondly, the police, on nine separate occasions, had a special relationship with Sutcliffe - they were in the room while they interviewed him, they had suspicions, and he was repeatedly raised as a suspect in the investigation. Not only this, but Sutcliffe had a history of prior offences, he had a gap in his teeth, he matched the vast majority of photofits uncannily, he worked in contact with oil, and he had size-seven boots. All of these characteristics pointed to his identity as the killer, and yet the police failed to put two-and-two together, instead choosing to focus on hoax calls and letters, which had been dismissed by multiple officers, experts, and surviving victims. Thirdly and finally, the police had, on numerous occasions, declared their commitment to apprehending Sutcliffe. Unlike in the case of Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales police had made multiple commitments to catch the Yorkshire Ripper, and, as in Capital Counties plc v Hampshire County Council, by recklessly pursuing irrelevant lines of inquiry, the West Yorkshire police had actually worsened the situation. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the Court should have found a duty of care towards Hill. 

When, then, should this duty of care have arisen? There are numerous options which warrant further investigation, which I have ordered from least plausible to most:

• After the first victim. 
• After the police concluded there was a serial killer at large. 
• After a victim profile had been created. 
• After the police made their public commitment to apprehending the killer, and allocated the resources to ensure this wasn't an empty threat. 
• After the first interview with Sutcliffe. 
• After the ninth interview with Sutcliffe. 

It goes without saying that I am not an expert in catching serial killers, and therefore do not have the necessary knowledge to determine exactly when the duty of care should have arisen, but I believe it is a fair criticism to acknowledge the police failed to exercise their duty to catch Sutcliffe with reasonable care and skill, and that the police therefore breached their duty to the victims after a point. Would, then, other victims of Sutcliffe have standing to bring a claim against the police for negligence? I think it is fair to say that the first few victims would not be able to do this, but it is certainly possible that some of the later victims would perhaps have a claim. 

One of the more powerful speeches comes from Lord Templeman, who forcefully and compassionately rejects the possibility of a public policy justification for finding the police liable. He acknowledges that the purpose behind Hill's claim is not to gain compensation for a wrongful death - no money could replace her life - but instead to ensure that no other victims die unnecessarily as a result of a catastrophic police investigation. Templeman recognises that this is outside the powers of the court; they cannot ensure quality training, remuneration, funding, and equipment. This is a fitting conclusion to this case. The failure of the hunt to catch the Yorkshire Ripper does not rest on one individual, but rather a series of missteps by the entire force. 

Despite this, and my greatest sympathies to the family of the victims, and the police officers who dedicated over two million hours of work to catching Sutcliffe, I do believe that Hill's death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the police's failure to catch the killer; that the police were in a relationship of proximity to a man they interviewed no less than nine times; and it would be fair, just, and reasonable to impose liability, not simply for the purposes of compensating a devastated family for a preventable death, but also to acknowledge the reckless failures of the police to conduct a rational and skilled investigation which would have led to Sutcliffe's arrest. While the police do, and must, have a broad discretion to conduct criminal investigations, they must also be able to justify the actions they took, and prove they talk all the reasonable steps to successfully conclude the investigation, as such is their duty to the general public.

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